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small hill, and collided with an unlighted truck just below the crest of
the hill. In its decision, the court pointed out that, by statute, curves
and hills are conditions a motorist is required to consider in regulating
his speed "as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, ve-
hicle, or other conveyance."2 5  That requirement, considered in con-
junction with the rule of the Weston case was held to be one of the
two circumstances which prevented the plaintiff from getting to the
jury. The other was evidence of the inattentiveness of the driver. The
court did not indicate whether the first circumstance alone would have
been sufficient to support its decision. If so, and if the case is later
interpreted to mean that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive
around a curve and over the crest of a hill on a clear night at a speed
of 40 to 45 miles per hour, then it would seem that the court has taken
a step toward the adoption of a mathematical formula for the solving
of these rear-end collision cases.
LEMUEL H. GIBBONS.
Trusts-Duration-Rule against Perpetuities
A died in 1923 leaving property by will in trust for his son B, with
a power of appointment in B by will, the property to go to B's children
if he died intestate. B, a widower, died, in 1945, leaving one-half the
property to his two infant children upon their reaching age 25 and the
other half in trust for them for life with power to appoint by will to
a class or a charity. Upon the trustee's request for instructions, held,
the children take the property free of the trust and the power; the
equitable life estates would probably last longer than 21 years after the
death of B and thus violate the Rule against Perpetuities. 1
There is a difference of opinion as to the point in time when the
period of the rule against remoteness of vesting begins to run, where
there is a general power of testamentary disposition. Some authorities
maintain that the period starts when the power is exercised, because
the donee could appoint to his estate, which is practically like appointing
to himself.2 Others claim that it is just like any other special power
because of the inability to appoint to oneself and that it should start
when the power was created, either by deed'or will.3 The weight of
5 Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 781, 47 S. E. 2d 251, 252 (1948).
'American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N. C. 458, 46 S. E. 2d 104 (1948).
2 Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927); Rous v. Jackson,
29 Ch. D. 521 (1885); KALEs, ESTATES, FuruRE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDI-
TIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS §695 (2d ed. 1920).
'De Charette v. De Charette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S. W. 2d 1018 (1936) ; Hawkins
v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928); Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120
N. E. 167 (1918) ; In re Lewis' Estate, 349 Pa. 571, 37 A. 2d 482 (1944) ; In re
Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 Atl. 396 (1936); In re Powell's Trusts, 39
L. J. Ch. 188 (1869); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §526 (4th ed.
1942) ; RooD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLs 779 (2d ed. 1926) ; 2 SIMaES,
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authority, aided or led by Professor Gray,4 holds that the time is meas-
ured from the creation of the power.5 In the principal case, the court,
following earlier North Carolina cases, adhered to the majority rule.6
And it was conceded that the rule against remoteness of vesting ren-
dered void the power to vest the fee beyond the lives of the children.
Most courts7 and text writers s are in accord with the view that the
Rule against Perpetuities, as such, does not render a trust invalid merely
because it may extend beyond the time limit if the interests thereunder
vest within the specified time. However, a new rule of American
origin,9 which is adhered to in the majority of states which have con-
sidered it, that an indestructible private trust may not continue for a
period longer than that of the Rule against Perpetuities, renders the
trust void. This rule, unknown in England because indestructible
trusts are not there favored,' 0 has been introduced in America to in-
crease alienability and to prevent circumvention of the Rule against
Perpetuities by the use of the trust device,"1 though not without oppo-
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §538 (1936); 3 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY §713 (3d ed. 1939) ; 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY §340 (1947); see Notes, 33 GEO. L. J. 234 (1945), 1 A. L. R. 374
(1919).
'GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §526.
See note 3 supra. It is otherwise where the power is exercisable by deed or
will, the theory being that the donee is practically the owner since he can appoint
to himself. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
'Hardee v. Rivers, 228 N. C. 66, 44 S. E. 2d 476 (1947) ; Roane v. Robinson,
189 N. C. 628, 127 S. E. 626 (1925) ; White v. White, 189 N. C. 236, 126 S. E.
612 (1925) ; Chewning v. Mason, 158 N. C. 578, 74 S. E. 357 (1912) ; FARWELL, A
CONCISE TREATISE ON PowERs 325 (3d ed. 1916).
Wilbur v. Portland Trust Co., 121 Conn. 535, 186 AtI. 499 (1936) (where
cestui que trust was also entitled to legal estate upon termination of the trust) ;
Loomer v. Loomer, 76 Conn. 522, 57 Atl. 167 (1904) ; Story v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 155 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S. W. 2d 720 (1938); Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514,
120 N. E. 167 (1918) (again appointment in trust for life to child unborn at death
of donor upheld) ; Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896) ; Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Robb, 118 N. J. Eq. 529, 180 Atl. 410 (1935) ; In re Wanamaker's
Estate, 335 Pa. 241, 6 A. 2d 852 (1939); In re Boyd's Estate, 199 Pa. 487, 49
Atl. 297 (1901) (here A left property in trust to minor daughter for life with
power of appointment by will, which she validly exercised by setting up a trust
for her son's life, though her attempt to give him a power of appointment was
invalid); Tramell v. Tramell, 162 Tenn. 1, 32 S. W. 2d 1025 (1930) ; see In re
Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354, 367, 20 Atl. 521, 523 (1890). Contra: Colonial
Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 AtI. 555 (1926).
'GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §232; 1 PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §383 n. 2(a) (6th ed. 1911); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§62(k) (1935); 1 Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939); 2 TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §408 (3d ed. 1939). Contra: 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§500, 553.
11 BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §218 (1935) ; Scott, Control
of Property by the Dead 11, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 632 (1917).
"0 Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (1841).
"it re Howard's Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 312 (1945) ; In- re Stephen's Estate,
129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 AtI. 653 (1937); REmSEN, THE PREPARATION OF WIL S
AND TRUSTS §10 (2d ed. 1930) ; 1 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939) (it
is against public policy to permit continuance of such a trust though interests are
all vested).
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sition.12 The principal case is the first direct decision in North Caro-
lina that this rule against excess duration of an indestructible private
trust operates to make a vested trust estate void. Heretofore, North
Carolina has declared that the Rule against Perpetuities as applied in this
state is the rule against remoteness of vesting,13 and that it is concerned
only with the vesting of estates, not with their enjoyment or possession.
14
The North Carolina court has frequently stated that the Rule against
Perpetuities does not apply to charitable trusts, and this is repeated in
the principal case. What is meant, however, is that a charitable trust
will not fail for excessive duration,15 because of the countervailing
public gain. For the rule against remoteness of vesting does apply to
charitable trusts, except where the property vests in one charity after
another charity.18 Indeed, in the principal case, the power of appoint-
ment that was concededly stricken by the rule against remoteness was
a power to leave the property to charity in the alternative.
ROBERT L. HINES.
Wrongful Death-Amendment of the Pleadings after the
Limitation Period Has Run
In a recent case' the plaintiff sued to recover for the wrongful death
of her husband, alleging that as he was driving along the highway in a
careful manner the defendant "negligently and carelessly" ran into him
from the rear and killed him. The defendant entered a demurrer ore
tenus at the trial, which was sustained on the ground that the complaint
did not state any fact constituting negligence. The plaintiff was granted
permission to amend. She then enumerated items of negligence, and
was awarded a judgment of $6550 on a jury verdict of negligence. On
appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court stated the rule that an amend-
ment which introduces a new cause of action will not relate back to the
" Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896); REsTATEDENT,
PROPERTY §378 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §62(k) (1935).1 Vinson v. Gardner, 185 N. C. 193, 116 S. E. 412 (1923); Springs v. Hopkins,
171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916) ; O'Neal v. Borders, 170 N. C. 483, 87 S. E.
340 (1915).
14 Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916); accord, Story v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 155 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Hawkins v.
Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928) (where the four appointees, given life
estates in trust, were unborn at creation of power of appointment and estates were
held valid) ; Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253 (1867). GRaY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§121.5; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 8, §383.
" Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro, 218 N. C. 686, 12 S. E. 2d 253 (1940) ; State
ex. rel. Wardens v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21 (1943) ;
2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, §352; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra mote 8, §384; 3 Scorr,
op. cit. supra note 11, §365.
" Williams v. Williams, 215 N. C. 739, 3 S. E. 2d 334 (1939) ; 2 BoGER, op.
cit. supra note 9, §§ 342-349; GRaY, op. cit. supra note 3, §594; 3 WALSH, Op. cit.
supra note 3, §341; see Reynolds Foundation v. Trustees of Wake Forest College,
227 N. C. 500, 513, 42 S. E. 2d 910, 918 (1947).'Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948).
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